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Abstract
Under the definition of moral virtue to Aristotle mainly 
from the “genus” and “differentia” moral virtue of two 
aspects. Define the essence of a thing is the concept of 
the provisions of the general is the most classic is the 
“definition =genus + differentia”. That is the definition 
of a thing explanation, first find out what kind of belongs 
to the concept that this type of thing universality; and 
which also have their respective different things or that 
they own feature, this is the case worse. In a nutshell is, 
the first thing to classify, that is, he has the universality, 
and then again to its unique characteristics, which are the 
personalization will be summarized thus distinguished.
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INTRODUCTION
Aristotle analyzed genus of virtue first when he defined 
moral virtue in his The Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle 
think that virtues from the soul, the soul is the passion, 
ability, character of three parts, so virtue is inevitable is 
one of the three. Aristotle made a clear classification to 
the soul that soul has three parts: irrational, rational, and 
there are both rational and irrational. Everything has a 
soul. Also a part of the human soul is non-rational that 
same as animals and plants. The irrational is almost all an 
instinctive drive. As part of the soul is rational, is a kind 
of cognition, is also a part of being human peculiarly, is 
that people of reason. Besides, there are also part of both 
rational and irrational, also means belonging rational and 
irrational, this part usually referred to as “desire”. 
1. THE GENUS OF MORAL VIRTUE: IT 
IS A STATE OF CHARACTER, NOT A 
PASSION NOR A CAPACITY
Irrational part of the soul is not virtue. Rational part of 
the soul is intellectual virtue. Divided into rational and 
irrational part of the soul is moral virtue. Moral virtue is 
derived from will part of the soul. Moral virtue is derived 
from the soul. And the soul has three parts that passion, 
ability and personality. It is only one of them, then after 
excluding two and the rest is the moral virtue that belongs 
to the “genus”.
Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they 
are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it 
is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, 
but the man who also does them as just and temperate 
men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just 
acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate 
acts the temperate man; without doing these would have 
even a prospect of becoming good. But most people do 
not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are 
being philosophers and will become good in this way, 
behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to 
their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered 
to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such 
a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in 
soul by such a course of philosophy.
Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things 
that are found in the soul are of three kinds—passions, 
capacities, states of character—virtue must be one of 
these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, 
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envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, 
pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied 
by pleasure or pain; by capacities the things in virtue of 
which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of 
becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states 
of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or 
badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to 
anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, 
and well if we feel it in an intermediate way; and similarly 
with reference to the other passions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, 
because we are not called good or bad on the ground 
of our passions, but are so-called on the ground of our 
virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised 
nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels 
fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply 
feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain 
way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or 
blamed.
Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the 
virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further, 
in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in 
respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be 
moved but to be disposed in a particular way. For these 
reasons also they are not capacities; for we are neither 
called good or bad, nor praised or blamed, for the simple 
capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the 
capacities by nature, but we are not made good or bad by 
nature; we have spoken of this before (Aristotle, 2003). 
If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capacities, 
all that remains is that they should be states of character. 
Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.
Passion refers to the desire, envy, anger, fear, 
confidence, happy, friendly feeling, hatred, desire, envy, 
compassion, which is feelings associated with pleasure or 
pain generally. Passion is a kind of emotion, emotion is a 
“genus” of passion. And differentia of passion is a feeling 
accompanying by pleasure or pain. And ability is a power 
that able to feel those passions, such as anger, pain, and 
pity. The ability to actually refers to the ability to have 
passion, it is the basis of passion. So, passion and ability 
are connected. And this ability is not an ordinary ability, 
but passion-based capability.
 Character, is relationship with these our feelings of 
good or bad. For example, we are in a bad relationship 
with the feelings of anger, when we are too weak or 
excessive anger. We are in a good relationship with this 
feeling of anger, when anger appropriately. We are in 
a bad relationship with a fury relationship, if anger is 
moderate, we will in good relations with this feeling. In 
other words, beyond a certain degree of anger is evil, on 
the contrary, if we are in an appropriate way is a kind of 
good. Other feelings may also and so on. Aristotle said: 
“the virtue and vicious so are not passion”. We feel good 
is good, we feel the evil is a vicious, so corresponding 
virtue is vicious, corresponding good is evil. 
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with 
choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this 
being determined by reason, and by that reason by which 
the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is 
a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess 
and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean 
because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed 
what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue 
both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence 
in respect of what it is, i.e. the definition which states its 
essence, virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and 
right an extreme.
Virtue is a character, but also a vicious character; 
Virtue is a kind of the behavior of the intermediate, is a 
kind of good character, and vicious is a violation of the 
intermediate behavior, is a kind of evil character. Virtue 
and vicious refer to is a kind of long-term habit of having 
constant character. Therefore, virtue is not equal to the 
good, vicious also is not equal to evil. One or a few good 
thing does not represent a virtue and do not represent 
the same or a few bad things can not represent vicious. 
Definitely not the good and virtue, evil and vicious 
confused. Emotion itself cannot be based on good and 
evil, only lay on the basis of moral passion can call it the 
good, the intermediate is laid on the emotional is good, 
and becomes evil. We can’t accord to a person’s fear, 
desire, hatred, friendly, happy emotion and to blame or 
praise, these emotions are everyone has, so has nothing 
to do with the moral emotion. Aristotle explained: “we 
feel fear or anger has nothing to do with choice”, because 
of fear or anger is a kind of ability, it is not selected is 
instinctive, “but virtue is to choose the right way, virtue 
consists of choice”. 
Therefore, virtue is a choice model, and the ability 
to feel fear and anger has nothing to do with choice. 
You should use what kind of way to judge the virtue and 
vicious? The way of moral judgment is the intermediate, 
but the vicious way of judgment is excessive and less. 
We will not just because of have the ability to feel the 
passion and praise or blame, also can’t so call good or 
evil. And we are born with this ability, and virtue is not 
born with, not from naturally, virtue is a kind of habit, 
is a kind of intermediate habits, good habits; and also 
a vicious habit, a habit of excessive or less, evil habits, 
life is not down with this ( good or evil) habits, virtue 
is acquired or vicious form. Well, Aristotle virtue is 
excluded emotions, ability, so it can only be a character. 
So, Aristotle excluded the virtue is emotion, is the ability, 
so it can be to character. There are a lot of character, 
but virtue is a kind of what kind of character? Only to 
determine such a question, make a virtue the definition 
of “genus+ differentia”, to be able to grasp the essence of 
virtue. 
We must, however, not only make this general 
statement, but also apply it to the individual facts. For 
among statements about conduct those which are general 
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apply more widely, but those which are particular are 
more true, since conduct has to do with individual cases, 
and our statements must harmonize with the facts in 
these cases. We may take these cases from our table. 
With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage 
is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds 
in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no 
name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, 
and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence 
is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains—not all 
of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the 
mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons 
deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; 
hence such persons also have received no name. But let us 
call them “insensible”.
With regard to giving and taking of money the mean 
is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and 
meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short 
in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and 
falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in 
taking and falls short in spending. (At present we are 
giving a mere outline or summary, and are satisfied with 
this; later these states will be more exactly determined.) 
(Aristotle, 2009). With regard to money there are also 
other dispositions—a mean, magnificence (for the 
magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former 
deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an 
excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, 
niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to 
liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated 
later. Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil 
belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans 
conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to 
succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason 
also one is easy and the other difficult—to miss the mark 
easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, 
excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean 
of virtue.
To illustrate virtue is not only a character, but also that 
it is a kind of what kind of character, how to distinguish 
it from other personality. The meaning of “virtue” is 
excellent and outstanding, the essence of something 
is to make it different from other things. So, it can be 
said that every virtue or prominent role in making such 
remarkable things in a perfect state, and make it run well. 
For example, even if the eye is the eye of virtue to become 
the eyes and make it in excellent condition; because, by 
virtue of the eye so that we see very clearly. That is to say, 
the eyes are virtuous, a good pair of eyes is not sick and 
is in a good state of its external manifestation is to see 
something clearly and see clearly that the eyes of Germany 
or excellence and outstanding. The virtue of a knife is 
sharp, cutting things. The nature of the housing is livable, 
suitable for people to live is the virtue of housing; it is 
important to note that in this case, the “virtue”, does not 
mean moral virtue, it is about the general virtue. Aristotle 
is seeking the moral virtue by general virtue. Human 
virtues and other virtues should have in common it is that 
people can be in a good condition and do their own thing.
2 .  THE  D IFFERENTIA OF  MORAL 
VIRTUE: IT IS DISPOSITION TO CHOOSE 
THE “INTERMEDIATE”
“Genus” is common, especially the nature of virtue, 
that is, Virtue “is a differentia.” In each of the sustained 
separable things, there are three possible, too little, too 
much or equivalent, or in this case is the content itself, 
either for us (people); Equal is a middle way between 
excessive and less. Was moderate refers to the distance 
between each extreme equal distances, this distance is 
a “one” and all the circumstances are the same; relative 
to our people, but also moderation is neither too little, it 
is not “a” and not all people are the same. For example, 
10 is more (too) and 2 is small (less than), intermediate 
6 is moderate middle. However, for people are not so 
simple, is not the simple addition and subtraction can be 
calculated.
The so-called “moderate” is not the same for everyone, 
“moderate” it is constantly changing. “Amount” There 
are three that is excessive, less appropriate and the three 
“quantity” should be the amount of the main word, what 
kind of “quantity” reflects its “quality” mean? The main 
word here is “moral virtue” three “quantity” to reflect 
in its “quality” (moral virtues, the nature of virtue, 
reflect the quantity and quality) is moderate. “Quality” 
that is the essence, Aristotle defined as the search for 
a predetermined nature of moral virtue “quality” is 
“moderate”. This refers to moral virtue; it is a passion 
and behavior related behavior among passion and there is 
excessive, less and intermediate. The moral virtue should 
insist on appropriate behavior and emotional “quality”, 
otherwise it is not a virtue but a vicious; since moral 
virtue is moderate, so malignant or abuse is excessive 
and less. For example, fear, confidence, desire, anger, 
compassion, joy may be excessive or less, both of which 
are not so good a situation; but should be, for in due time, 
to the appropriate object, the right people, by appropriate 
incentives, in an appropriate way to deal with or treat 
these emotions, that is, this is the virtue of the properties 
of the middle way.
“For a similar behavior also have excessive, less and 
moderate.” A behavior also has it is excessive, less and 
moderate, behavior if, as a subject, from the analysis on 
“quantity” is the three conditions. Moral virtue refers to 
the behavior.
Virtue is associated with passion and emotion, behavior, and in 
our own actions and emotions, excessive is a form of failure, as 
is also a form of failure, and moderate is laudable, because it is a 
form of success; praise and success are moral attribute.
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 A brave behavior, it should be able to brave to do one 
thing, if did not complete the fail this behavior may not 
be brave; brave on the results should be successful. Moral 
behavior is praised by people’s behavior, is successful, this 
may be modest can use praise or success. In contrast here 
is talking about right and wrong should be construed as 
legal and illegal. Unfair is also varied (as the Pythagoreans 
imagined evil is unlimited, but the good is limited), just 
as the road is only one, and there are many improper way, 
which is why success it is difficult, it is easy to fail. That 
is because it is excessive and less evil characteristics, 
and moderation is the virtue characteristics. So virtue is 
a choice of quality, present in relative moderate among 
us, and this is appropriate logs provided. Virtue is the 
middle of the two kinds of evil that excessive and less. In 
the emotion and practice, and the evil or not due, or more 
than, virtue is to find and select the appropriate justified. 
The answer is, not all of the feelings and practice have a 
moderate state. There are some actions and feelings, its 
name means evil. Such as shameless, envy, and murder, 
stealing and adultery in behavior. Because they themselves 
are evil, not due to excessive and less to them. In these 
matters, legitimate and illegitimate does not depend on 
whether we are with the right person, at the right time 
or place to do it in an appropriate way, but just do these 
things are improper. That is similar to such behavior does 
not exist in a moderate amount of excessive and moderate, 
there is no excessive proportionate and less modest. 
CONCLUSION
“So, virtue is a kind of intermediate, its purpose is to 
moderate.” Aristotle said is very reasonable. But think 
about it is not entirely so, some successful acts did not 
necessarily have the virtue, and the failure of some 
behavior is not necessarily without virtue; some failed, 
not praised behavior may also be virtuous behavior, even 
noble act. Therefore, it is determined whether an act 
of virtue can not simply look at whether the success or 
acclaim, praised the success or just a standard to judge 
behavior, but not the only criteria; it also includes a 
method for judging the ability of evil, when people it can 
be determined when the evil, but also be able to better 
judge the good.
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